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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury has attracted the at-
tention of the Supreme Court numerous times throughout history 
and several times just within the past decade. 1 It has also received the 
attention of many outstanding academics and commentators.2 The 
Seventh Amendment provides that: 
1. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 
(2001) (reviewing a manufacturer's claim of trade infringement, false ad-
vertising, and unfair competition and reviewing what level of appellate re-
view shall be used in determining if a jury award is consistent with due 
process and the reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment); City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (ad-
dressing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon a city's denial of its de-
velopment proposals and addressing whether there was a right to a jury in 
§ 1983 actions); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 
(1998) (reviewing whether copyright infringement actions are afforded a 
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment); Hetzel v. Prince William County, 
Va., 523 U.S. 208 (1998) (deciding whether a writ of mandamus violated 
the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humani-
ties, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (deciding whether a New York statute em-
powering appellate courts to order new trials when the jury's award 
"deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" violated 
the Seventh Amendment); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370 (1996) (discussing whether the construction of a patent claim was 
a matter of law for a judge or a matter of fact for a jury); Wooddell v. Int'l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991) (discussing whether 
the Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act provided a right to jury); 
Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (discussing whether 
an employee is entitled to a jury trial when seeking backpay for a union's 
alleged breach of its fiduciary duty). The Court's analysis in Teny governed 
its decision in Wooddell and therefore is included in the cases decided 
within the past decade. 
2. The legislative history behind the Amendment has been exhaustively ex-
amined in Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 
80 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1966), and Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional 
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973). For an under-
standing of the historical aspects of the Amendment see THE FEDERALIST 
No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). For additional analysis of the treatment of 
the Amendment, see Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Sev-
enth Amendment Right to a Civil jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1005 (1992); Ste-
phen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL. 
L. REv. 1020 ( 1967); Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial lly jury and the Reform of 
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In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried to a jury, shall be otherwise reexam-
ined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law. 3 
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This amendment establishes the balance of power among federal 
juries, federal trial judges, and federal appellate courts by "preserving" 
the essential aspects of the right to a jury trial as it existed under the 
English common law system when the Amendment was adopted.4 
In analyzing Seventh Amendment jurisprudence generally, the 
Court divided its inquiry into three separate and distinct inquiries. 
The first, and perhaps most commonly addressed inquiry, in light of 
the multitude of new statutory causes of action, is whether the cause 
of action was tried at law at the time of the founding or is analogous to 
one that was tried at that time.5 This inquiry focuses upon the nature 
or character of the cause of action and first compares "'the statutory 
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior 
to the merger of the courts of law and equity [and] [s]econd ... 
examine[s] the remedy sought [to] determine whether it is legal or 
equitable in nature.' "6 
If the action had been tried at law, the Court would move to the 
second inquiry. The Court would determine "whether the particular 
trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of 
the common-law right as it existed in 1791."7 If the issue falls within 
this category, then the issue must fall to the jury.8 Finally, the third 
component of the inquiry involves the level of judicial review permit-
ted once the jury has returned a verdict on this issue, including both 
Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 669 (1918); Charles Warren, New Light on 
the History of the Federal judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923). 
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. 
4. Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); see also 
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 
16, 750). Justice Story cavalierly stated: 
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the 
common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all), 
but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of our 
jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound the 
grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to every per-
son acquainted with the history of the law. 
Id. at 750. 
5. E.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417 (1987) (holding that there was 
a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial to determine governmental lia-
bility under the Clean Water Act). 
6. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (quoting Tull, 481 
u.s. 412). 
7. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
8. /d. at 376-79. 
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the proper function of the trial judge and the proper scope of appel-
late review.9 
The language of the Amendment bases all three inquiries upon the 
historical treatment as it existed in 1791 common law England.10 In 
its analysis of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court, 
predominantly through the first inquiry, carefully "preserves" the ba-
sic right to jury over the cause of action. However, at the same time, 
the Court denigrates that right by finding few incidents of the jury 
right fundamental to the essence of the trial by jury and allowing fairly 
aggressive review of jury decisions.U This trend is highlighted by sev-
eral recent decisions of the Supreme Court: Teamsters Local No. 391 v. 
Terry, 12 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 13 and City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 14 with those of Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 15 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,16 and Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group. 17 
This Article begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court cases 
decided in the past decade that deal with the right to a jury trial. 18 
First, the Article analyzes the Court's decisions regarding the basic 
right to a jury trial in the statutory actions of Terry, Feltner, and Del 
Monte Dunes. 19 Next the Article analyzes Markman, Gasperini, and 
Cooper Industries, which address the essential aspects of a jury trial and 
the scope of the reexamination clause in an attempt to determine 
their significance and impact on the Court's Seventh Amendment ju-
risprudence. 20 The Article then discusses how these decisions are in-
dicative of a trend that is consistent with the history of the Court's 
9. /d. at 384-91. 
10. There are several outstanding sources for a review of historical practice in 
common law England. E.g., IJ. OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANuscRIPTS AND 
THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAw IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (Chapel Hill & 
London, 1992); Harold Chesnin & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Chancery Proce-
dure and the Seventh Amendment: jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 
83 YALE LJ. 999 (1974); Patrick Devlin, jury Trial of Complex Cases: English 
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980); 
Fleming, James, Jr., Right to a jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE LJ. 655 
(1963); John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A 
Rebuttal, 83 YALE LJ. 1620 (1974) (rebutting Chesnin's and Hazard's 
piece); M.T. Van Heeke, Trial by jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C. L. REv. 157 
(1953); C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey ofEquity]urisdiction, 4 HARv. L. REv. 99 
(1890); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1961). 
11. See infra Part III.B. 
12. 494 U.S. 558 (1990); see also infra Part II.A.l. 
13. 523 U.S. 340 (1998); see also infra Part II.A.2, Part II.B.2. 
14. 526 U.S. 687 ( 1999); see also infra Part II.A.3, Part II.B.3. 
15. 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also infra Part II.B.l. 
16. 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see also infra Part II.C.l. 
17. 532 U.S. 424 (2001); see also infra Part II.C.2. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part I I.A. 
20. See infra Part II.B-C. 
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Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.21 The Court emphasizes the 
preservation of the basic right to jury under the first inquiry, while it 
de-emphasizes the essence and scope of that right under the second 
and third inquiries. 22 
II. THE MOST RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SEV-
ENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
A. The Basic Right to jury Trial 
1. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry 
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terrf3 ex-
tensively addressed the basic right to trial by jury in an Article III 
court.24 The Court held that the Seventh Amendment entitled "an 
employee who seeks relief in the form ofbackpay for a union's alleged 
breach of its duty of fair representation [to] a right to trial by jury."25 
The plaintiffs were employed by McLean Trucking Company.26 Mc-
Lean and the Union were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement 
that set forth the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' employ-
ment.27 The plaintiffs, objecting to various employment practices of 
McLean, as well as the Union's treatment of certain grievances filed 
against McLean, filed an action in federal court alleging that McLean 
had violated section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act by 
breaching the collective-bargaining agreement.28 Additionally, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the Union "violated its duty of fair representa-
tion."29 The plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction and dam-
ages for lost wages and health benefits, as well as a jury trial.30 During 
litigation, McLean filed for bankruptcy and was dismissed from the 
suit along with the claims for injunctive relief. 31 Thus, the remaining 
claim was against the Union for payment of lost wages and health ben-
efits. The Union brought a motion to strike plaintiffs' request for jury 
on the ground that no Seventh Amendment right existed.32 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). The Supreme Court has since decided Wooddell v. 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991), 
which held that Terry governed the right to jury analysis of a claim brought 
under Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1998), seeking injunctive 
relief, lost wages and benefits, and other monetary damages. Because the 
Court performed an extensive analysis in Terry rather than Wooddell, this 
article discusses Terry. 
24. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565. 





30. Terry, 494 U.S. at 562-63. 
31. !d. at 563. 
32. !d. 
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The Terry Court set forth the traditional Seventh Amendment two-
step inquirfl3 to determine whether a right to jury existed for a statu-
tory cause of action by examining "both the nature of the issues in-
volved and the remedy sought."34 The Court stated, "[f]irst we 
compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the 
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. 
Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is 
legal or equitable in nature."35 The Court continued by stating that 
"[t]he second inquiry is the more important in our analysis."36 
a. The Plurality 
The Justices disagreed over the proper analogy to the breach of 
duty of fair representation, arguing between an attorney malpractice 
action, an action at law, and an equitable action involving a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim brought by a trust beneficiary against a trustee.37 
The plurality determined that the equitable action captured "the rela-
tionship between the union and the represented employees" more 
fully; however, it did not persuade the plurality to characterize the 
claim as "wholly equitable."38 Rather, because "[t]he Seventh Amend-
ment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather 
than the character of the overall action" and the breach of duty is only 
one issue to be resolved in this action, the character of the employee's 
action against McLean for violation of the collective-bargaining agree-








!d. at 565. The majority noted that a third step, "whether 'the issues 
[presented by the claim] are typical grist for the jury's judgment,"' does not 
affect this analysis as it "is relevant only to the determination of 'whether 
Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an 
administrative agency ... and whether jury trials would impair the function-
ing of the legislative scheme.'" !d. at 565 n.4 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. 
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)). In his concurrence, Justice Brennan 
noted that the historical step should comprise of only one step: characteri-
zation of the nature of the relief sought. !d. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). This would simplify the analysis 
and make it "more manageable than the current test" and "more reliably 
grounded in history." Id. at 578 n.7. However, the characterization of the 
remedy is not always easy. For example, the circuits were horribly split on 
the question of whether a party has a right to trial by jury under the copy-
right laws when requesting statutory damages. E.g., Cass County Music Co. 
v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 638-41 (8th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the various 
circuits decisions and noting the split among them). The Eighth Circuit 
held that the statutory damages were "legal" in nature and that the jury 
should determine the amount of the award. Id. at 643-44. The Supreme 
Court ultimately resolved this issue in Feltner. See infra Part II.A.2. 
Terry, 494 U.S. at 565. 
!d. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)). 
!d. (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,42 (1982)). 
!d. at 567-68. 
!d. at 568. 
!d. at 569 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)). 
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issue was "comparable to a breach of contract claim - a legal issue" 
leaving the plurality in "equipoise" to be resolved by the characteriza-
tion of the remedy.40 
Turning to the request for damages for back pay and health bene-
fits, the Court noted that because these damages were not wrongfully 
withheld by the Union, but rather by McLean, the damages were not 
restitution damages.41 There was no longer any injunctive relief 
sought; therefore, the damages were not equitable as "incidental to or 
intertwined with injunctive relief."42 Finally, the Court distinguished 
the relief sought with the characterization of relief sought under Tide 
VII, which some courts have held to be equitable, holding that the 
remedy requested was legal and that a right to jury attached to "all 
issues presented in [the] suit."43 
b. The Dissent 
The dissent argued that the plurality opinion created an "analytic 
innovation" to expand the right to jury trial over an action that is 
purely equitable.44 However, such a trend appears consistent with 
prior Supreme Court cases addressing the basic right to ajury.45 The 
dissent agreed that the breach of fiduciary duty was the closest analo-
gous action at common law, but found it improper to separate this 
issue from the contract issue and characterize them separately.46 Fur-
ther, the dissent distinguished the Beacon Theaters,47 Dairy Queen,48 and 
Ross49 cases50 upon which the majority relied for such treatment 
stating: 
Although we have divided self-standing legal claims from eq-
uitable declaratory, accounting, and derivative procedures, 
we have never parsed legal elements out of equitable claims 
absent specific procedural justifications ... just as the plain-
tiff in a duty of fair representation action against his union 
must show breach of the collective-bargaining agreement as 
an initial matter, in an action against a trustee for failing to 
pursue a claim the beneficiary must show that the claim had 
some merit .... Proving the breach of the collective-bargain-
40. Terry, 494 U.S. at 569-70. 
41. !d. at 570-71. 
42. !d. at 571 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987)). 
43. !d. at 573. 
44. !d. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
45. See infra Part liLA. 
46. Terry, 494 U.S. at 585, 588 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
47. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
48. 369 u.s. 469 (1962). 
49. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
50. Terry, 494 U.S. at 590 (Kennedy,]., dissenting); see also infra Part liLA (dis-
cussing Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross). 
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ing agreement is but a preliminary and indispensable step to 
obtaining relief in a duty of fair representation action. 5 
Justice Marshall, in response to the dissent, distinguished the na-
ture of the two "issues" from the "examination of the nature of each 
element of a typical claim"52 by noting that the two "issues" here 
would be brought as separate claims: one claim against the employer 
and the other claim against the Union. 5 3 Furthermore, Justice Mar-
shall noted that the treatment of the claims should not be determined 
by whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit against both 
defendants.54 In other words, had McLean not been dismissed, the 
plaintiff would have had a right to jury over its claim against McLean 
and the issues resolved by the jury would have precluded relitigation 
of them by the judge in the claim against the Union. 5 5 
Additionally, the dissent argued that the plurality characterized the 
relief incorrectly.56 Specifically, the dissent argued that the remedy 
for a breach of duty of fair representation is designed "to make the 
injured employee whole."57 Moreover, neither exemplary nor puni-
tive damages were available to the plaintiffs.58 Such relief "parallels 
the remedies prevailing in the courts of equity in actions against trust-
ees for failing to pursue claims ... and differ[s] somewhat from those 
available in attorney malpractice actions" brought in common law 
courts that could award exemplary damages. 5 9 Justice Marshall, in re-
sponse, criticized the dissent for "conflat[ing] the two parts of our 
Seventh Amendment inquiry" by relying on the nature of the action to 
determine the nature of the remedy. 60 
2. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 
In 1998, the Court in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 61 
addressed the question of whether the Seventh Amendment provides 
a right to jury trial on all issues relevant to an award of statutory dam-
ages in a copyright infringement action, including the amount itself.62 
Feltner had acquired several television stations and had licensed sev-
eral television series for those stations from Columbia Pictures.63 Felt-
51. Terry, 494 U.S. at 590-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
52. /d. at 569 n.6. This question was also presented in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). See also infra Part II.B.l. 
53. Terry, 494 U.S. at 569 n.6. 
54. /d. 
55. !d. 
56. /d. at 587 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
57. /d. 
58. /d. 
59. Terry, 494 U.S. at 587-88. 
60. /d. at 571 n.8. 
61. 523 u.s. 340 (1998). 
62. /d. at 342. 
63. /d. Feltner owns Krypton International Corporation. /d. 
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ner failed to pay the royalty payments and Columbia terminated the 
licenses.64 Nevertheless, Feltner continued broadcasting the shows.65 
Columbia brought suit against Feltner alleging copyright infringe-
ment and seeking various forms of relief, which included a permanent 
injunction, impoundment of all program copies, actual damages, or 
alternatively, statutory damages, attorney's fees and costs.66 
a. The Ninth Circuit's Holding 
The Copyright Act of 197667 allows a copyright owner '"to recover, 
instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages 
... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court 
considers just."'68 The trial judge denied Feltner's request for a jury 
on statutory damages and the Ninth Circuit agreed.69 The Ninth Cir-
cuit had held that under the Copyright Act of 1909, the judge was to 
assess statutory damages.70 The court then "reasoned that '[i]f Con-
gress intended to overrule [that decision] by having the jury deter-
mine the proper award of statutory damages, it would have altered' 
the language 'as the court considers just'" when it amended the Act in 
1976.71 Thus, the statute does not grant a jury tria1.72 Furthermore, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Seventh Amendment does not 
provide a right to jury for statutory damages because statutory dam-
ages are equitable in nature. 73 
b. The Supreme Court's Holding 
The Supreme Court, although agreeing that there is no statutory 
right to a jury, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit with respect to its 
Seventh Amendment analysis. 74 The Court noted that there are close 
analogues to actions seeking statutory damages for copyright infringe-
ment from 18th century England.75 The Court followed the historical 
64. !d. at 342-43. 
65. !d. at 343. 
66. !d. 
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1995). 
68. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1995)). 
69. !d. at 344. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. at 345 (quoting Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Bir-
mingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
72. Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 
F.3d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1997). 
73. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345. Equity is defined, in part, as a "remedy recogniza-
ble by a court of equity." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999). 
74. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345-47. Thus, the Court held that§ 504(c) (the statutory 
damages provision) violated the Seventh Amendment and is unconstitu-
tional. !d. at 345. Nevertheless, this does not render the provision constitu-
tionally unenforceable. Columbia Pictures v. Krypton Broad. of 
Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9thCir. 2001). 
75. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 348-49. 
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development of a suit for the infringement of a property right, begin-
ning in the mid-17th century, where "the common law recognized an 
author's right to prevent the unauthorized publication of his manu-
script."76 Such suits seeking damages for infringement were tried as 
actions on the case in courts of law. 77 When the first English copy-
right statute was enacted, actions seeking damages under the statute 
were again tried in courts of law. 78 Moreover, this practice was fol-
lowed in this country by the common law79 and continued to be fol-
lowed after the Congress passed the first copyright statute in 1790.80 
Columbia did not dispute this historical evidence, arguing instead 
that statutory damages were equitable in nature.81 The Court dis-
agreed, explaining that monetary relief is generally legal and "an 
award of statutory damages may serve purposes traditionally associated 
with legal relief, such as compensation and punishment."82 Further, 
monetary relief is not deemed equitable "simply because it is 'not 
fixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula' ... [as] there is his-
torical evidence that cases involving discretionary monetary relief 
were tried before juries."83 Thus, the Court held that the Seventh 
Amendment applies to a copyright infringement action seeking statu-
tory damages.84 
3. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. 
The following year, the Court again addressed the right to jury trial, 
this time for a claim brought under§ 198385 in City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes.86 In this case, Del Monte Dunes held interest in land 
that it wanted to develop within the jurisdiction of the City of Monte-
rey.87 Mter repeated proposals and subsequent rejections by the City, 
Del Monte Dunes brought suit under § 1983 claiming that the City 
had affected a regulatory taking "without paying compensation or pro-
viding an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss. "88 At trial, 
the court submitted the question of liability under the regulatory tak-
ings claim to the jury.89 The Court, in determining whether this was 
76. /d. at 349. 
77. /d. 
78. /d. 
79. /d. at 350. 
80. /d. at 351. 
81. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352. 
82. /d. 
83. /d. at 353 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 n.7 (1987)). 
84. /d. The second question, whether that right includes the right to have the 
amount determined by the jury, is discussed below. See infra Part II.B.2. 
85. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1995). 
86. 526 u.s. 687 (1999). 
87. /d. at 693-94. 
88. /d. at 694. 
89. /d. at 707. 
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proper,90 reiterated two questions presented under the Seventh 
Amendment: first, whether the claim "'was tried at law at the time of 
the founding or is at least analogous to one that was,' "91 and, if so, 
"whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to 
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 
1791."92 With respect to the first question, the Court explained that 
the Seventh Amendment's phrase "'suits at common law' include not 
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and set-
tled proceedings, but [also] suits in which legal rights were to be ascer-
tained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable 
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were adminis-
tered.' "93 The Court concluded that the claim sounded in tort, a 
traditional legal claim.94 Moreover, the monetary relief for just com-
pensation and the unconstitutional denial of such compensation was 
compensatory in nature and, thus, traditional legal relief, making the 
claim a proper one for jury consideration.95 
Four Justices dissented on the grounds that the plurality "miscon-
ceives a takings claim under § 1983 and draws a false analogy between 
such a claim and a tort action."96 The dissent agreed with the City 
that the proper analogy is an inverse condemnation proceeding 
"given their common Fifth Amendment constitutional source and link 
to the sovereign's power of eminent domain."97 In fact, "[t]he ulti-
mate issue is identical in both direct and inverse condemnation ac-
tions: a determination of 'the fair market value of the property 
[taken] on the date it is appropriated,' as the measure of compensa-
tion required by the Fifth Amendment."98 Thus, at common law at 
the time of the framing, the closest analogue to the inverse condem-
nation claim "was that of direct condemnation, and the right to com-
pensation for such direct takings carried with it no right to a jury 
trial."99 
90. Id. "We next address whether it was proper for the District Court to submit 
the question of liability on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to 
the jury." Id. 
91. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)). 
92. Id. For an analysis of the second step see infra Part II.B.3. 
93. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 
447 (1830)). 
94. Id. at 709 (stating that "(j]ust as common-law tort actions provide redress 
for interference with protected personal or property interests, § 1983 pro-
vides relief for invasions of rights protected under federal law"). 
95. Id. at 709-11. Del Monte Dunes was seeking to restore what it had lost, not 
what the taker had gained. Id. at 710. 
96. I d. at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
97. Id. at 734. 
98. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 734 (quoting Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)). 
99. Id. at 739. 
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Furthermore, the dissent argued that the analogy to tort must 
fail. 100 The dissent asserted that the Supreme Court had previously 
denied the right to a jury trial in direct condemnation proceedings, 
which is an equally sound tort analogue. 101 Moreover, analyzing the 
action as one under § 1983 is generally too sweeping. The dissent 
stated that "the remedy is not damages for tortious behavior, but just 
compensation for the value of the property taken."102 The dissent fur-
ther explained: 
While the statute is indeed a prism through which rights 
originating elsewhere may pass on their way to a federal jury 
trial, trial by jury is not a uniform feature of § 1983 actions. 
The statute provides not only for actions at law with damages 
remedies where appropriate, but for "suit[s] in equity, or 
other proper proceeding[s] for redress." Accordingly, rights 
passing through the § 1983 prism may in proper cases be vin-
dicated by injunction . . . orders of restitution . . . and by 
declaratory judgments ... none of which implicate, or always 
implicate, a right to jury trial. 
Even if an argument for § 1983 simplicity and uniformity 
were sustainable; however, it would necessarily be weaker 
than the analogy with direct condemnation actions. That 
analogy rests on two elements that are present in each of two 
varieties of condemnation actions: a Fifth Amendment con-
stitutional right and a remedy specifically mandated by that 
same amendment. Because constitutional values are supe-
rior to statutory values, uniformity as between different appli-
cations of a given constitutional guarantee is more important 
than uniformity as between different applications of a given 
statute. 103 
Once again the plurality held that the basic right to a jury trial at-
taches to the statutory cause of action. 104 Thus, in three out of three 
cases, the Court held that a right to a jury attached to statutory ac-
tions.105 Moreover, in two of the cases there were strong and persua-
sive dissenting opinions. 106 These results are consistent with the 
historical trend of an aggressive stance when interpreting the right to 
jury trial for statutory claims. 107 This trend, however, reverses when 
the Court is confronted with "incidents" of the right to jury.108 
100. Id. at 748. 
101. Id. at 749-50. 
102. Id. at 752. 
103. Id. at 751-52 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
104. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 709. 
105. See supra notes 25, 84, 95, 97 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra notes 44-60, 96-103 and accompanying text. 
107. See infra Part liLA. 
108. See infra Parts II.B, III. B. 
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B. Incidents of the Right to jury 
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
In a rather unusual move, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 109 a patent case on appeal from 
the Federal Circuit. 110 The Court addressed the applicability of "a 
Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine the mean-
ing of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is of-
fered" to "the interpretation of a so-called patent claim .... "111 This 
seemed unusual because the Supreme Court has heard relatively few 
patent appeals from the Federal Circuit since the Federal Circuit was 
established in 1982 to be the exclusive arbiter of patent cases.112 
There is less need for Supreme Court review of these cases because 
the expertise and jurisdictional grant of the Federal Circuit to resolve 
issues of patent law for the nation sets national precedent and uni-
formity in the creation of the patent laws.U 3 However, the Federal 
Circuit was severely divided on the issue presented in Markman, 114 
providing some incentive for the Supreme Court to review the deci-
sion. Because the Court ultimately sided with the majority of the Fed-
eral Circuit, it seems likely that the Court wanted to seize an 
opportunity to set Seventh Amendment precedent more generally 
than merely to address an issue specific to the patent law 
community.115 
a. The Lower Court Decisions 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.U 6 raised significant issues con-
cerning the proper roles of the jury, trial judge, and Federal Circuit in 
patent infringement litigation. The determination of patent infringe-
ment is a two-step inquiry.117 First, the meaning and scope of the pat-
ent claim language as understood by "one skilled in the art" must be 
determined. 118 Second, the accused product must be compared to 











517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman 1]. 
!d. at 376; see also infra text accompanying notes 135-56. 
Markman I, 517 U.S. at 372. 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1) (1994)); see generally 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CiRCUIT-A HISTORY 
1982-1990, 11, 229 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991). 
Williams v. Dept. of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485, 1498 (1983). 
See infra note 139. 
See infra Part II.B.l.b. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
[hereinafter Markman III], affd, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. Pa. 1995) (en bane) 
[hereinafter Markman II], affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
Markman II, 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. Pa. 1995). 
!d. 
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accused product "reads on," or infringes, the patent claim. 119 The 
issue for the court was to decide whether the first step was a question 
of fact or law, and if a question of fact, whether a Seventh Amendment 
right to jury applied. 120 
Herbert Markman was the inventor and owner of a patent on an 
inventory control and reporting system for dry-cleaning stores that he 
licensed to Positek, Inc., a dry-cleaner. 121 Markman sued Westview In-
struments, Inc. and Althon Enterprises, Inc. in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania for infringement of multiple claims of his patented in-
vention.122 Westview manufactured and sold electronic devices to the 
dry-cleaning industry, including the accused product used by Althon, 
a dry-cleaning establishment. 123 The accused device, an inventory 
control and reporting system, records descriptions of the articles of 
clothing but retains in memory only the invoice number, date, and 
cash total for each customer by means of a data input device, proces-
sor, printer, and scanner.124 
In dispute at trial was the proper interpretation of the term "inven-
tory" in the patent claim. 125 If inventory included articles of clothing 
and not only cash totals, then the Westview device would not in-
fringe.126 At trial, the jury was presented evidence concerning the 
meaning of the term inventory, including: the patent specification, 
claim language and prosecution history, Markman's own testimony, 
the testimony of a patent expert, and the testimony of the president of 
Westview. 127 At the conclusion of Markman's case-in-chief, Westview 
moved for judgment as a matter of law.128 The trial judge deferred 
ruling on the motion. 129 At the close of the evidence, the court 
charged the jury on infringement, instructing the jury to determine 
the meaning of the claims and then to compare the claims with the 
Westview device to determine whether there was infringement.130 
The jury returned a verdict of infringement on two claims. 131 
119. !d. 
120. Id. at 970-71. 
121. Id. at 971. The patented invention is designed to solve inventory-related 
problems of the dry-cleaning business: for example, the loss of clothing and 
the theft of proceeds by employees. Id. at 971. To accomplish this, the 
patented invention monitors and reports the "status, location and 
throughput of inventory in an establishment" by means of a data input de-
vice, processor, printer, and scanner. Id. at 971-72. 
122. Id. at 972. 
123. Id. 
124. !d. 
125. Id. at 975. 
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The court then granted Westview's deferred motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, finding that claim construction was a matter of law 
for the court. 132 The court based its decision on the established no-
tion that a "'mere dispute concerning the meaning of a term does not 
itself create a genuine issue of material fact.'" 133 The court held that 
"inventory" meant "articles of clothing" and, because it was undis-
puted that Westview's device was incapable of tracking articles of 
clothing, it did not infringe Markman's patent. 134 
Markman appealed the court's grant of judgment as a matter oflaw 
to the Federal Circuit.135 Markman argued that the meaning of the 
claim language is a question of fact to be decided by the jury at trial, 
and that the jury verdict was "supported by substantial evidence."136 
Thus, Markman asserted that the trial judge deprived him of his right 
to a jury by reinterpreting the claims merely because he disagreed 
with the jury's interpretation. 137 Furthermore, Markman argued that 
the trial judge misinterpreted the term inventory to necessarily in-
clude articles of clothing. 138 
The Federal Circuit, en bane, affirmed the district court's grant of 
judgment as a matter of law, with judges Mayer and Rader concurring 
in the judgment and Judge Newman dissenting. 139 The majority held 
that determining the meaning of claim language is an issue of law 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and notwithstanding incon-
sistencies in prior Federal Circuit precedent.140 The majority based its 
decision on the "fundamental principle of American law that 'the con-
struction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court,">I 41 and 
on the need for consistency in the determination of the scope of a 
patentee's rights. 142 Moreover, the m~ority held that the court may 
rely upon extrinsic evidence external to the patent and prosecution 
history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and 
treatises, to determine the proper meaning of the claim language 
when the court is unfamiliar with the terminology of the art. 143 This 
process, however, does not involve the crediting of evidence, the mak-
ing of factual findings, or the clarifying of ambiguous language; thus 
132. !d. 
133. Markman III, 772 F. Supp. at 1536 (quoting Becton Dickerson & Co. v. C.R. 
Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
134. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 973. 
135. !d. 
136. !d. at 974. 
137. !d. at 973-74. 
138. !d. at 974. 
139. !d. at 970. 
140. !d. 
141. !d. at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (Mar-
shall, CJ.)). 
142. !d. 
143. !d. at 980. 
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the inquiry is not an issue of fact, but rather one of law. 144 Conse-
quently, the majority reviewed the record de novo, and affirmed the 
trial court's determination that the term inventory included articles of 
clothing. 145 
Judge Mayer, in his concurrence, claimed that the majority 'jetti-
sons more than two hundred years of jurisprudence, and eviscerates 
the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment ... [and] 
marks a sea change in the course of patent law that is nothing short of 
bizarre."146 Judge Mayer argued that while the ultimate issue of claim 
scope is one of law, it is based upon "underlying factual issues."147 
Such factual issues may need to be resolved by resorting to extrinsic 
evidence. 148 Judge Mayer asserted that "[i]f this information clarifies 
the meaning of the claims and is uncontested, the judge may rule as a 
matter of law."149 However, if the claim scope is unclear even with 
extrinsic evidence, the resulting genuine factual dispute over the 
meaning of a term falls to the fact finder for resolution. 150 Moreover, 
Judge Mayer argued that because an action for patent infringement 
requesting damages would have been heard in the law courts of En-
gland and because the determination of the meaning of a term in the 
claim language goes to a fundamental element of the substantive 
claim, the jury must resolve the underlying factual dispute. 151 
Judge Newman, in dissent, also stated that when the meaning of 
claim terms is in dispute, the resolution is a question of fact that de-
pends upon credibility, weight, and the probative value of conflicting 
evidence.152 This is an issue of fact for the jury, given the historical 
200-year precedent of patent infringement jury trials in the United 
States.153 Moreover, Judge Newman argued that to allow an appellate 
court to review de novo such a determination results in less accurate 
decision making because the determination is the result of an eviden-
tiary showing and not intellectual abstraction. 154 Judge Rader, con-
curring, declined to address the question of whether claim 
interpretation is an issue of law or one of fact for a jury because the 
record at trial lacked substantial evidence to support the jury ver-
dict.155 Therefore, Judge Rader opined that the grant of judgment as 
a matter of law was correct.156 
144. Id. at 981. 
145. Id. at 981-82. 
146. !d. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 991. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 992. 
152. Markman II, 52 F. 3d at 999-1000 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1009. 
155. Id. at 998-99 (Rader, J., concurring). 
156. Id. 
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b. The Supreme Court Decision 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 157 Justice Souter delivered 
the court's unanimous opinion.158 Justice Souter began by framing 
the issue quite narrowly. 159 However, the holding appeared a bit 
more expansive stating: "We hold that the construction of a patent, 
including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the prov-
ince of the court."160 
After briefly describing the nature of patent actions and the facts of 
Markman, the Court launched into its Seventh Amendment analy-
sis.161 The Court noted that modern patent infringement actions de-
scend from "infringement actions tried at law in the 18th century, and 
there is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a 
jury."162 Thus, as to the first inquiry, the Court held that there is 
clearly a right to a jury in patent infringement actions. 
( 1) Characterizing the Issue: Construction of a Patent Claim 
The second inquiry of the Court's seventh amendment jurispru-
dence was at issue in this case. The Court questioned "whether a par-
ticular issue occurring within a jury trial (here the construction of a 
patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue, the guarantee being es-
sential to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dis-
pute."163 The Court described this guarantee as depending upon 
"whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to pre-
serve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.' "164 The Court 
further stated that "' [ o] nly those incidents which are regarded as fun-
damental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by 
jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.' "165 
These guidelines have been more narrowly defined as referencing a 
"distinction between substance and procedure"166 and as "between is-
157. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
158. !d. at 371. 
159. !d. at 372; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating the issue 
framed by Justice Souter). 
160. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 372. 
161. !d. at 376. 
162. !d. at 377 (citing Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. P.C. 168 (K.B. 1789)). 
163. !d. 
164. !d. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,426 (1987) (quoting Colgrove 
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973))) (emphasis added). 
165. !d. at 377-78 (quoting Tul~ 481 U.S. at 426; Galloway v. United States, 319 
U.S. 372, 392 (1943)); see also Bait. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 
654, 657 (1935). 
166. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378 (citing Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390-91; Balt. & 
Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920); 
Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1887)). But see Sun Oil 
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988). 
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sues of fact and law. "167 Interestingly, the Court did not look to these 
traditional distinctions to decide this issue but rather stated that the: 
[S]ounder course, when available, is to classifY a mongrel 
practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of 
evidence) by using the historical method, much as we do in 
characterizing the suits and actions within which they arise. 
Where there is no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in 
comparing the modern practice to earlier ones whose alloca-
tion to court or jury we do know[,] seeking the best analogy 
we can draw between an old and the new~68 
To characterize the historical analogue approach as more sound-
especially when, as here, "the old practice provides no clear answer" 169 
-is peculiar given the Court's difficulties in the past in reconstructing 
accurately an appropriate analogue to the cause of action.170 Recon-
structing the treatment of specific issues within the cause of action as 
it existed in 1791 England was more difficult for the Court because 
the Court attempted to determine the closest 18th century analogue 
of modern claim construction even though claims were not a part of 
patent practice at that time, but became statutorily recognized in the 
United States in 1836.171 
Admittedly, drawing lines between substance and procedure or fact 
and law are also highly problematic and unpredictable. 172 Neverthe-
167. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378 (citing Balt. & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657; Ex 
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 310; Walker, 165 U.S. at 597). But see Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)). 
168. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378 (citations omitted). 
169. !d. at 377. 
170. E.g., Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 566-69 (1990); Tull v. United States, 
481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-97 (1974). 
171. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 379. 
172. For problems inherent in distinguishing procedure from substance see 
CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE § 191 (1911) ("The distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory."); Walter 
Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE LJ. 
333, 343, 352, 356 (1933) (explaining that the line between "substance" 
and "procedure" does not exist in a vacuum but rather must be drawn to 
better carry out the underlying purpose of making the distinction). The 
category in which to place statutes of limitations provides an excellent ex-
ample of this quandary. The Court, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 
(1988), explained that such statutes can have different characterizations 
depending upon the context. Id. at 726. For example, for choice of law 
purposes, statutes of limitations are "procedural" and the forum state may 
apply its own statute of limitations even if applying another state's "substan-
tive" law. !d. at 727. However, for Erie purposes, the statute of limitations is 
considered "substantive." Id. The "substance-procedure" dichotomy is a 
function of the purpose of the context in which the characterization is 
made. !d. For choice of law purposes, the characterization is made to "de-
limit spheres of state legislative competence," whereas for Erie purposes, the 
characterization made is to establish uniformity between state and federal 
fora. Id. at 727. Thus, any given rule or law may be "procedural" in one 
context yet "substantive" in another. Id. For problems inherent in distin-
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less, they have been relied upon over the years and provide useful 
tools for analyzing the rationale behind the allocation of a particular 
issue to the jury or judge.173 Moreover, the distinction between fact 
and law is crucial to determining the standard of appellate review as 
well. 174 Blindly searching the historical cases for an analogous issue 
that was perchance submitted to a ~ury during the infant stages of jury 
patent practice in the late 1 700s, 1 5 combined with the documented 
uncertainty of practitioners at that time, 176 merely reflects the "manu-
facture of a historical fiction." 177 
The Markman Court proceeded to wade through numerous old 
cases, scholarly articles, and treatises in an attempt to determine 
guishing questions of fact from those of law see Baumgartner v. United States, 
322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (noting the difficult nature of the distinction be-
tween questions of fact and questions of law); Martin Louis, Allocating Adju-
dicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A 
Unified View of the Scope of Review, The judge/jury Question, and Procedural Dis-
cretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993 (1986); James Thayer, "Law and Fact" in jury 
Trials, 4 HARv. L. REv. 141 (1890); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil jury Trial 
and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867 (1966). 
173. For example, in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), the Court 
addressed the distinction between questions of law and fact in the context 
of a Title VII employment discrimination action. Id. at 287-88. The ques-
tion was "whether the differential impact of the seniority system" of an em-
ployer "reflected an intent to discriminate on account of race" in violation 
of Title VII was a pure question of fact, subject to a clearly-erroneous stan-
dard of review rather than a question of law or a mixed question of law and 
fact. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) establishes the standards of 
review as a function of the nature of the issue, but provides no guidance 
with respect to distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact. I d. at 
288. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The Court relied on precedent that had 
held that in other contexts, questions of intent had always been deemed a 
matter of pure fact. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288 (relying on Dayton 
Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 (1979) (holding that the intent 
to discriminate is a factual finding); Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 
(1960) (holding that the intent of the donor to establish a "gift" under the 
tax code is a factual finding)); and United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 
338, 341 (1949) (holding that intent to restrain trade under anti-trust laws 
is a factual finding)). The Pullman-Standard Court distinguished a finding 
of intent, which is factual, from the use of evidence to support such a find-
ing based upon the consequences of the defendant's actions. I d. at 288-89. 
For example, the substantive law may allow the introduction of discrimina-
tory impact to help establish actual "intent," but the law is not satisfied 
based upon "a legal presumption ... drawn from a factual showing of some-
thing less than actual motive." Id. at 289-90. Courts have relied upon legal 
presumptions over the years as these presumptions provide useful tools for 
analyzing the rationale behind the allocation of a particular issue to the 
jury or judge. See generally Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985); 
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 369-70 (1982); Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979). 
174. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287-88. 
175. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 380. 
176. Id. at 380-81. 
177. Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 578 n.7 (1990) (Brennan,]., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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whether juries routinely decided the closest analogue to claim con-
struction: specification construction. 178 The Court distinguished the 
role that the specification played historically from the role the claims 
play today, relying heavily upon the general proposition that judges 
customarily interpreted written documents.179 Accordingly, the Court 
found no persuasive authority indicating more than a possibility that 
juries historically interpreted terms of art in a specification.18° Conse-
quently, the jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment did not en-
compass the jury's construction of the claim. 
The Court next turned to other indicators in order to allocate the 
issue between judge and jury.181 These indicators included "existing 
precedent and consider both the relative interpretative skills of judges 
and juries and the statutory policies ... furthered by the allocation," 
specifically the need for uniformity in the construction of patent doc-
uments.182 These indicators do not involve the Court's Seventh 
Amendment precedent because the Court had already determined, 
based solely upon its historical analogue analysis, that there was insuf-
ficient evidence of common law practice to invoke a constitutional 
right to have a jury decide this issue.183 
Ultimately, the Court held that the issue would be determined by a 
judge.184 The Court found that although precedent provided no cer-
tain answer, judges are better suited to construct written documents, 
even when credibility determinations are at issue.185 This opinion was 
based upon the Court's expectation that: 
[A]ny credibility determinations will be subsumed within the 
necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, re-
quired by the standard construction rule that a term can be 
defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a 
whole. Thus, in these cases a jury's capabilities to evaluate 
demeanor, to sense the "mainsprings of human conduct," or 
to reflect community standards, are much less significant 
than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to 
the overall structure of the patent.186 
The importance of uniformity in patent construction is another 
ground for allocating the determination to the judge.187 Uniformity 
178. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378-80. 
179. !d. at 381-83. 
180. !d. at 384. 
181. !d. 
182. !d. at 384, 390-91. 
183. !d. at 383-84. 
184. !d. 
185. !d. at 388. 
186. !d. at 389-90 (citations omitted). 
187. !d. at 390. 
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is essential in providing the public with clearly defined limits of the 
patentee's rights. 188 
(2) Unresolved Issues 
Perhaps the most telling aspect of the Court's decision lies in the 
findings the Court deliberately chose not to make. Several times 
throughout the opinion, Justice S~mter expressly stated issues that 
might be important but were not decided in this case. 189 First, the 
Court noted that the "formulations of the historical test do not deal 
with the possibility of conflict between actual English common law 
practice and American assumptions about what that practice was, or 
between English and American practices at the relevant time."190 
Next, relying fairly heavily on the general practice of judges constru-
ing terms in a written document, the Court explained that it need not 
consider "whether [the] conclusion that the Seventh Amendment 
does not require terms of art in patent claims to be submitted to the 
jury supports a similar result in other types of cases."191 Finally, the 







Because we conclude that our precedent supports classifying 
the question as one for the court, we need not decide either 
the extent to which the Seventh Amendment can be said to 
crystallize a law/fact distinction, 192 or whether post-1791 pre-
cedent classifying an issue as one of fact would trigger the 
protections of the Seventh Amendment if (unlike this case) 
there were no more specific reason for decision. 193 
Id. The Court noted that while "issue preclusion could not be asserted 
against new and independent infringement defendants ... treating inter-
pretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) 
intrajurisdictional certainty through application of stare decisis on those 
questions not yet subject to inteijurisdictional uniformity under the author-
ity of the single appeals court." Id. at 391 (first emphasis added) (alteration 
in original). 
Id. at 376 n.3, 383 n.9, 384 n.lO. 
Id. at 376 n.3. Although an inquiry of American interpretation of English 
common law may affect Seventh Amendment analysis, the question of how 
American practices differ from English practice should not be a concern 
because the language of the Seventh Amendment was based upon English 
common law practices. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. 
Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). 
Markman I, 517 U.S. at 383 n.9. The Court came to this conclusion, despite 
an observation of a late 18th century historian that "interpretation by local 
usage for example (today the plainest case of legitimate deviation from the 
normal standard) was still but making its way." Id. at 383. 
Id. at 384 n.lO. This comment is startling because perhaps the most ac-
cepted role of the jury is to be the fact-finder in a case to which the right to 
jury attaches. See infra Part III.B.l (discussing precedent supporting the 
fundamental notion of the jury as fact-finder). 
Markman I, 517 U.S. at 384 n.l 0 (citations omitted). This comment reflects 
yet another interesting point. Although English common law practices 
would not have provided for a jury right, American practice since 1791, may 
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Interestingly, the following year, Warnerfenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co. 194 was accepted by the Court on appeal from the Federal 
Circuit.195 The primary issue on appeal concerned the proper scope 
of the "doctrine of equivalents," that is, a judicially created doctrine 
which allows a finding of infringement when there are "insubstantial 
differences" between the patent and the allegedly infringing prod-
uct.196 Related to this issue was the issue of whether the scope of the 
doctrine in a given case was for the judge or jury to decide.197 The 
Federal Circuit had determined that it was an issue for the jury.198 
The Supreme Court declined to address the issue, as it was not neces-
sary to its decision. 199 In this manner, the Court left the issue as one 
for the jury, pursuant to the Federal Circuit decision, but expressly 
stated that it was not deciding that it would side with the Federal Cir-
cuit if it was presented with the issue.200 
2. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 
Recall that in Feltner,201 the Court held that a right to jury attached 
to a copyright infringement claim seeking statutory damages.202 Also 
invoke a right to jury under the Seventh Amendment. On the other hand, 
the Court, at least on one occasion, has essentially allowed entrenched fed-
eral precedent that established a procedure detracting from the right to 
jury based upon a misunderstanding or ignorance of the English common 
law, to remain intact even after recognizing the error made. In Dimick v. 
Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935), Justice Sutherland noted that Justice 
Story, in 1822, had cited no authority whatever for the conclusion that the 
Court had power to grant a new trial unless the plaintiff were willing to 
remit a portion of its award. /d. He remarked that: 
[T] he sole support for the decisions of this court and that of justice 
Story, so far as they are pertinent to cases like that now in hand, 
must rest upon the practice of some of the English judges-a prac-
tice which has been condemned as opposed to the principles of the 
common law by every reasoned English decision ... which we have 
been able to find. 
/d. at 484. He further stated that if the question of remittitur was to be 
taken up again, the decision might well be decided differently. !d. How-
ever, because the doctrine "has been accepted as the law for more than a 
hundred years and uniformly applied in the federal courts ... [it] would 
not be ... disturbed." /d. at 484-85. Nevertheless, the Dimick Court refused 
to find additur constitutional by extending "doubtful precedent . . . by 
mere analogy to a different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert 
what it conceives to be a principle of the fundamental law of the land." /d. 
at 485. 
194. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
195. See id. 
196. See id. at 21, 39. 
197. See id. at 38. 
198. Warner:Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en bane). 
199. Warnerfenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39. 
200. !d. at 38-39. 
201. 523 U.S. 340 (1998); see also supra Part II.A.2. 
202. See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
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in question was whether Feltner had the right to have the jury assess 
the amount of statutory damages in an action historically brought in a 
court of law.203 The Court concluded that a right did exist, relying on 
a long history that "the jury are judges of the damages"204 and that 
this was consistent practice in copyright cases as well. 205 
Columbia argued that the Court's prior decision in Tull demon-
strated that a jury determination of damages was not necessary to up-
hold "'the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.' "206 In 
Tull, the Court "held that the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a 
jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil penalties under the 
Clean Water Act, but then went on to decide that Congress could con-
stitutionally authorize trial judges to assess the amount of the civil 
penalties."207 However, the Court in Feltner distinguished Tull.208 In 
Tull, there was no historical evidence that a jury must assess the 
amount of civil penalties to be paid to the government. 209 Addition-
ally, awarding such penalties was more analogous to sentencing in a 
criminal proceeding, a decision made by a judge.210 Here, however, 
"there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct historical 
evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, 
set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff."211 
3. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Ltd. 
The Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Ltd.,212 
after finding that Del Monte had a right to a jury trial generally, also 
had to determine whether the particular issues of liability were proper 
for jury determination.213 The Court, using the historical method, 
found that the determination of liability in a tort action for monetary 
damages was most often decided by a jury rather than ajudge.214 Nev-
ertheless, the Court explained that neither the historical method, nor 
existing precedent established a definitive answer and, thus, turned to 
considerations of process and function. 215 However, unlike the result 
in Markman,216 the Del Monte Dunes Court held that the questions 
203. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342. 
204. Id. at 353. 
205. Id. at 354. 
206. Id. (quoting Colgrave v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)). 
207. Id. 




212. 526 u.s. 687 (1999). 
213. Id. at 718. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 718-20. 
216. See supra notes 178-200 and accompanying text; see also Markman I, 517 U.S. 
370, 391 (1996) (holding that patent claim construction is an issue for the 
judge). 
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presented were predominantly factual issues and were therefore 
proper for jury consideration. 217 
The Court then divided the liability issue into two questions.218 
First, on the question of eminent domain, the Court held that the 
conclusion that a landowner had been deprived of "all economically 
viable use of his property" is a factual determination to be reserved for 
the jury.219 The Court arrived at this holding because regulatory tak-
ings cases often involve an assessment of a particular set of facts in 
light of the economic impact and purposes of the government's ac-
tions.220 Under the Seventh Amendment, a jury is the final arbiter of 
the ultimate dispute in eminent domain actions because of the case-
specific nature of the facts and the necessity to make specific inquiries 
in order to ensure just compensation to the landowner.221 
The resolution of the second question regarding "whether a land-
use decision substantially advances legitimate public interests within 
the meaning of [the Supreme Court's] regulatory takings doctrine" 
was less clear to the Court.222 This question was more "difficult," the 
Court opined, because the question "mixed" both factual and legal 
components.223 However, the trial court limited this "mixed" ques-
tion to a factual determination by asking the jury "whether, [consider-
ing all of the circumstances], the city's decision to reject a particular 
development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justi-
fications."224 The Supreme Court upheld the submission of this ques-
tion to the jury because the question was "narrow [and] fact-
bound."225 
The Court determined that while there.was no constitutional right to 
a jury trial in eminent domain actions, 226 the jury was the better de-
liberator of fact-based questions in those actions. 227 Recall that in 
Markman, 228 the Court refrained from deciding whether the Seventh 
Amendment crystallized a law/fact distinction.229 It appears that once 
the historical inquiry fails to show that a jury must determine the is-
sue, the Court finds there is no constitutional right to jury and turns 
instead to functional considerations in order to allocate the decision, 
although the decision does not rise to a constitutional right. 
217. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720-21. 
218. /d. 
219. /d. 
220. /d. at 720. 
221. /d. at 720-21 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). 
222. /d. at 721. 
223. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721. 
224. /d. 
225. /d. 
226. /d. at 711. 
227. /d. at 720. 
228. 517 u.s. 370 (1996). 
229. /d. at 378; see also supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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As in Markman, the Del Monte Dunes Court circumscribed its deci-
sion, noting several limitations on its holding.230 The Court stated 
that it was not addressing the jury's role in an ordinary inverse con-
demnation suit, in a temporary regulatory takings claim, nor in decid-
ing whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate 
governmental interests. 231 Here, the narrow questions disputed by 
the parties, and properly submitted to the jury, were "whether the gov-
ernment had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the 
bounds of its authority and, if so, the extent of any resulting 
damages. "232 
Markman, Feltner, and Del Monte Dunes demonstrate the Court's re-
luctance to find a Seventh Amendment right to have a jury decide 
specific issues or incidents of the cause of action to which a jury right 
attaches. 233 In two of the three cases, a Seventh Amendment right did 
not attach.234 This reluctance is further demonstrated by the Court's 
Reexamination Clause precedent, where the Court allows rather vigor-
ous review of jury decisions.235 
C. The Reexamination Clause 
1. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 236 the second decision of the 
Supreme Court's 1996 term dealing with the right to trial by jury,237 
involved interpretation of the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh 
Amendment: the scope of review of factual issues tried to ajury.238 In 
Gasperini, a journalist brought a diversity suit seeking damages for loss 
of 300 photographic transparencies under New York state law.239 New 
York state law empowered appellate courts to review the amount 
awarded by juries "and to order new trials when the jury's award 'devi-
ates materially from what would be reasonable compensation."'240 
This standard was designed by the state to influence the outcome of a 
jury's award of damages by tightening the range of tolerable 
awards.241 This conflicted with the more traditional standard, applied 
in New York prior to 1986 as well as in federal courts, under which 
230. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721-22. 
231. !d. 
232. Id. at 722. 
233. See supra Part II.B.1-3. 
234. See supra notes 160, 226-27 and accompanying text. 
235. See infra Part II.C. 
236. 518 u.s. 415 (1996). 
237. !d. at 418. See also generally Markman I, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Markman /was 
the first decision dealing with a right to jury decided during the 1996 term. 
!d. 
238. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418. 
239. ld. at 419. 
240. !d. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)). 
241. Id. at 419. 
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trial judges "would not disturb an award unless the amount was so 
exorbitant that it 'shocked the conscience of the court.' "242 Ordina-
rily, "appellate judges ... deferred to the trial court'sjudgment," over-
turning the judge's decision only upon a finding of abuse of 
discretion. 243 
The application of the New York standard involves two separate in-
quiries: first, whether the state law should govern in accordance with 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 244 and, if so, if application of the stan-
dard would violate the Seventh Amendment right to jury that applies 
to all federal court cases. 245 The Court recognized that the state law 
involved both substantive and procedural issues: controlling the 
amount that a plaintiff can be awarded (substantive); and assigning 
the decision-making authority to the state appellate courts (procedu-
ral).246 The procedural component of this law would be contrary to 
federal allocation of trial and appellate court functions, "an allocation 
weighted by the Seventh Amendment."247 
The Court analogized the standard imposed by the state law to a 
state statutory cap on damages, which all parties agreed would supply 
substantive law for Eriepurposes.248 The Court noted that while it had 
not addressed the issue, the "courts of appeal have held that district 
court application of state statutory caps in diversity cases, post-verdict, 
does not violate the Seventh Amendment."249 The only difference be-
tween the two is that the cap established here is set by case law rather 
than statute and, thus, is manifestly substantive such that the "twin 
aims of the Erie rule" are implicated.250 
But does application of the state law violate the Seventh Amend-
ment by shifting the fact-finding responsibility from the jury to the 
appellate court? The Court compared its decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Electric Cooperative, /nc.251 to the situation at hand, noting that 
the appellate court failed to account for an" 'essential characteristic of 
the [federal court] system.' "252 In Byrd, the Court explained that 
countervailing federal interests must be balanced against the state in-
242. /d. at 422 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 
1012-13 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
243. /d. 
244. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
245. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
246. /d. 
247. /d. 
248. /d. at 428. 
249. /d. at 429 n.9 (citing Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1161-65 (3d Cir. 
1989); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
250. See id. at 428 (stating that "the twin aims of the Erie rule [are] discourage-
ment of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of 
the laws"). 
251. 356 u.s. 525 (1958). 
252. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537). 
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terests in applying its laws.253 Based upon this balancing, the Byrd 
Court determined that although the state court denied the parties a 
jury determination of the factual issue involving the "sameness of the 
work of plaintiff and defendant's own employees,"254 the distribution 
of "functions between judge and jury ... under the influence - if not 
the command - of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of 
disputed questions of fact to the jury."255 Thus, the Court held that 
federal law would control in light of the strong federal interest 
demonstrated by the "trial by jury" clause.256 In Gasperini, a similar 
issue was raised, but it involved the Reexamination Clause. 257 
The Gasperini Court did not expressly decide the scope of the Sev-
enth Amendment.258 Rather, the Court reviewed prior case prece-
dent, noting that several changes in appellate review standards since 
common law England 1791 have been accepted by the courts.259 For 
example, although once deemed incompatible with the Seventh 
Amendment, appellate review of a federal trial court's denial of a mo-
tion to set aside a jury's verdict as excessive is now allowed by circuit 
courts under an abuse of discretion standard. 260 The Court noted 
that it approved of these decisions because such control is "necessary 
and proper to the fair administration of justice."261 The determina-
tion of whether an upper limit "has been surpassed is not a question 
of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ, but a ques-
tion of law" and thus reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment.262 
However, the majority was unwilling to go so far as to disrupt the 
allocation of power between the trial and appellate judges by allowing 
the appellate court to apply the "deviates materially" standard as dic-
tated by the state law, instead of an "abuse of discretion" standard.263 
Instead, the Court held that the district judge should determine 
whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by the state law, 
subject to review by the appeals court under an abuse of discretion 
253. See id. at 431-32 (citing Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38). 
254. Id. at 432 n.13 (discussing Byrd). 
255. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 (citingJacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942)). 
256. See id. at 538; see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432. 
257. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432. 
258. Id. at 434. 
259. Id. at 436 n.20. 
260. Id. at 434-35. 
261. Id. at 435. 
262. Id. (citing Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 
1961)). The Court noted that this alteration to the 1791 practice at com-
mon law is consistent with other changes made to common law practice 
over time, such as the current six-member jury, new trials restricted to de-
termination of damages, motions for judgment as a matter of law deter-
mined after a jury's verdict, and issue preclusion without mutuality of 
parties. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 n.20. 
263. Id. at 438-39. 
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standard.264 In this manner, the state and federal interests are 
preserved. 
This result potentially violates the Seventh Amendment in two ways. 
First, it allows appellate review of a trial court's refusal to set aside a 
jury's verdict using an abuse of discretion standard.265 Second, the 
result allows the trial judge to review the jury findings under a "devi-
ates materially" standard.266 
With respect to the first possible violation, Justice Scalia argued in 
his dissenting opinion that under common law, appeals courts could 
not review trial courts' refusals to set aside a jury verdict. 267 "[I] t is 
not possible to review such a claim without engaging in a 'reex-
amin [ation]' of the 'facts tried by the jury, "'268 Justice Scalia argued. 
Scalia noted that granting a new trial under this state law requires a 
two-step process. 269 The reviewing court must: (1) "determine the 
range it regards as reasonable" and (2) "determine whether the partic-
ular jury award deviates materially from that range."270 
The first step in this process requires the reviewing court to reexam-
ine facts decided by the jury, namely the amount of damages based on 
the evidence presented.271 Scalia noted that: 
[T]he sort of "legal error" involved here is the imposition of 
legal consequences (in this case, damages) in light of facts 
that, under the law, may not warrant them. To suggest that 
every fact may be reviewed, because what may ensue from an 
erroneous factual determination is a "legal erro.r," is to de-
stroy the notion that there is a factfinding function reserved 
to the jury.272 
This is precisely that to which the Anti-Federalists objected. As Jus-
tice Story explained in 1812: "[O]ne of the most powerful objections 
urged against [the Constitution prior to adoption] was that [the au-
thority granted to the court] ... would enable that court, with or 
without a new jury, to reexamine the whole facts, which had been set-
tled by a previous jury."273 Thus, the appellate court was limited to 











Id. at 438. 
I d. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Id. at 450. 
Id. at 461. 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 461 (quoting Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. 
Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1934)). 
Id. at 449. 
ld. (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1013 
(2d Cir. 1995)). 
Id. at 450; see also Metro. R.R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 574 (1887) (hold-
ing that the issue of excessive damages is a question of fact). 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464 n.10. 
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 
16,750). 
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facts. 274 The common law allowed review only on writ of error regard-
ing questions of law. 275 
With respect to the second possible violation, the majority did not 
independently decide whether review by the trial judge of the jury's 
verdict under a "deviates materially" standard was available at com-
mon law, and thus, compatible with the Seventh Amendment.276 In-
stead, the majority relied on two federal circuit court opinions for the 
proposition that application of a prescribed statutory cap on damages 
to limit a jury award is not violative of the Seventh Amendment, with-
out discussing the differences between a statutorily defined ca~ and a 
cap defined as a function of the standard of judicial review.27 
In Davis v. Omitowoju,278 the Third Circuit analyzed the Seventh 
Amendment constraints governing the reduction of a jury verdict 
based upon a state statute setting an upper limit of $250,000 for dam-
ages in medical malpractice cases. 279 The plaintiff argued that the 
judicial reduction of the jury verdict to the legislative limit violated the 
Reexamination Clause.280 The court, noting the paucity of precedent 
to govern this issue, discussed two relevant Supreme Court cases, Di-
mick v. Schiedt281 and Tull v. United States, 282 although neither case was 
dispositive of the issue.283 The court examined the holding in Tull, 
which asserted that a civil penalty does not need to be decided by a 
jury.284 It then distinguished this holding with the issue presented in 
Davis: whether, once a remedy determination has been submitted to a 
jury, the jury's remedial authority can be limited by legislation.285 
The Davis court based its holding that legislation may limit a jury's 
determination, after the fact, upon two different rationales. First, the 













Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
!d. 
See id. at 449-50. 
!d. at 429 n.9, 433 (relying on the Third and Fourth Circuits). 
883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit analysis in Bayd v. Butala, 
877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) held that the reduction of a jury verdict 
to the legislative cap governing in malpractice actions is a matter of law and 
thus does not violate the Seventh Amendment. The holding was quite ab-
breviated as compared to that of the Third Circuit. Id. 
Davis, 883 F.2d at 1157. 
!d. 
293 U.S. 474 (1935) (holding that the practice of additur violated the Sev-
enth Amendment, but upholding prior federal court precedent allowing 
remittitur despite the fact that this practice was disfavored by the English 
common law). Consistent with the notion that a remittitur was disfavored 
by the common law, the Court held that when imposing a remitittur, a 
court must allow the party the option of a new trial under Seventh Amend-
ment principles. Kennon v. Gilmore, 131 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1889), discussed in 
Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998). 
481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
Davis, 883 F.2d at 1159-60. 
ld. at ll60. 
!d. 
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not reexamine the facts decided by a jury, the legislative limit estab-
lished by statute is a matter of law. 286 If the legislature may abolish a 
cause of action altogether, it certainly has the power to limit its dam-
ages. 287 Thus, a reduction of the jury award to the legislative limit is 
merely conforming the verdict to the substantive law of the state.288 
The second rationale was based on a separation of powers argu-
ment and the underlying concern of judicial bias and tyranny that the 
Framers sought to avoid when establishing the Seventh Amend-
ment.289 The court noted that the Reexamination Clause expressly 
limits the reexamination of facts tried by a jury by any court, stating 
that it understood the language of the Seventh Amendment to guar-
antee the "integrity of the judicial process" and to act as a check on 
the trial judge's powers. 290 
In Davis, the district court judge did not reduce the jury's damage 
verdict because of a reexamination of the verdict. 291 Instead, the 
judge reduced the verdict to comply with legislation. 292 The court did 
not read the second clause as a limitation on the exercise of legislative 
authority and, hence, found that the Seventh Amendment was not vio-
lated by the reduction of the verdict. 293 In fact, the court noted that, 
had the jury been instructed as to the statutory cap, a Seventh Amend-
ment issue would not have arisen. 294 
Finally, the court reviewed several historical authorities in order to 
analyze the Framers' intent in drafting the second clause.295 Each au-
thority supported the proposition that the Framers were concerned 
with judicial bias and corruption, and designed the second clause to 
protect against an abuse of judicial power, not legislative power. 296 
286. !d. at 1161-62. 
287. !d. at 1161 (discussing Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) 
and Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (D. Md. 
1989)). 
288. See id. at 1162. 
289. Davis, 883 F.2d at 1164. 
290. !d. at 1161-62. The court opined that, while the legislature is not com-
pletely free from Seventh Amendment restrictions, the second clause "does 
not restrict the power of the legislature as it was exercised in enacting the 
malpractice damage cap at issue .... " !d. at 1162 n.ll. 
291. !d. at 1162. 
292. !d. 
293. !d. 
294. Davis, 883 F.2d at 1163. 
295. !d. at 1163-65. 
296. fd. Among the authorities cited were: BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAw, 689-90 (B. Gavit ed., 1941); HENRY HALLAM, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF ENGLAND, 139 (1847); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 563 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961); Henderson, supra note 2, at 293; Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 KuRLAND & 
LERNER, THE FouNDER's CoNSTITUTION 364 (1986); JoHN PHILLIP REID, 
CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REvoLuTioN, THE AuTHORITY 
OF RIGHTS 51 (1986). 
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However, the Davis court's second rationale fails in the case of Gas-
perini, which involved a legislative grant of authority to the courts to 
establish the statutory cap based upon a "deviates materially" stan-
dard.297 In Gasperini, the district court judge did reduce the jury's 
damage verdict by an act of reexamination, followed by an indepen-
dent finding of a verdict for a different amount.298 
2. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 
The most recent Supreme Court decision to address the scope of 
the reexamination of a civil jury decision is Cooper Industries, Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 299 In Cooper, the plaintiff asserted trade-
dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising claims, 
and requested punitive damages. 300 The jury returned its verdict, 
awarding $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in puni-
tive damages.301 The trial court rejected constitutional arguments 
that the punitive damages were "grossly excessive," and the defendant 
appealed. 302 The appellate court affirmed the punitive damage 
award, finding that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion in declin-
ing to reduce the amount of punitive damages."303 
At the Supreme Court level, the Court was asked to decide whether 
the appellate court used the correct standard of review.304 The Court 
held that "the constitutional issue merits de novo review."305 Such re-
view does not implicate the Seventh Amendment because "the level of 
punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury,"306 but is 
rather "a constitutional standard [applied] to the facts of a particular 
case."307 The Court noted that its decision in Gasperini, which held 
that the appropriate appellate standard of review was abuse of discre-
tion, was consistent, as that case involved the review of compensatory 
damages - not punitive damages.308 Furthermore, although the 
amount of punitive damages is generally left to the discretion of the 
jury, such precedent does not mean "that the amount of punitive 
297. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). 
298. See id. at 420. Justice Scalia expressly stated that he did not consider the 
reexamination issue because he rejected the decision on other grounds, 
namely that altering the trial judge review standard to "deviates materially" 
so disrupts the federal judgejury relationship that the state law should not 
apply. Id. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
299. 532 u.s. 424 (2001). 
300. See id. at 428. 
301. Id. at 429. 
302. ld. 
303. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437. 
307. Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 
( 1998)). 
308. See id. at 437. 
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damages imposed by the jury is itself a 'fact' within the meaning of the 
Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause."309 
The Court again imposed certain limits on its holding, stating that 
it was expressing no opinion on the question of whether Gasperini 
would govern "if a State were to adopt a scheme that tied the award of 
punitive damages more tightly to the jury's finding of compensatory 
damages."310 Accordingly, it is clear that in the two most recent deci-
sions concerning the Reexamination Clause,311 the Court is less pro-
tective of the right to jury and allows review of the jury verdict. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT GIVETH AND THE SUPREME 
COURT TAKETH AWAY 
A. The Supreme Court Giveth - Upholding the Basic Right to jury Trial 
The Seventh Amendment preserves to litigants the right to 
jury trial in suits at common law-not merely suits, which the 
common law recognized among its old and settled proceed-
ings, but suits in which legal rights were ascertained and de-
termined, in contradistinction to those where equitable 
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were 
administered .... In a just sense, the amendment then may 
well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity 
and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar 
form which they may assume to settle legal rightsY 
The jury's role as a fact-finding body has been found so important 
and vital to this country's jurisprudence that any limitation of the 
right to a jury trial "'should be scrutinized with the utmost care.' "313 
Throughout history, the Court has safely guarded this basic right to 
the "preservation" of trial by jury in cases determining "legal" 
rights.314 
This trend is seen quite clearly in two lines of cases. One holds that 
the right extends beyond the common-law forms of action recognized 
in 1791 and is applicable to new causes of action created by Con-
gress.315 The other line of cases stands for the proposition that "ex-
309. Id. at 437 n.ll (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432). 
310. Id. at 440 n.13. 
311. See supra notes 236-311 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gasperini 
and Cooper. 
312. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 
Pet. 433, 447 (1830)). 
313. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (quoting Di-
mick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). 
314. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-48 
(1998). 
315. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974) (reviewing prior Supreme 
Court precedent and stating that "[w]hatever doubt may have existed 
should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions 
enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the 
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pansion of adequate legal remedies provided by ... the Federal Rules 
necessarily affects the scope of equity."316 
1. Statutory Causes of Action 
Regarding statutory causes of action, as demonstrated above, 317 the 
Court has been quite liberal in finding a right to jury trial over statuto-
rily-created claims when Congress provides for judicial enforcement 
of the remedy provided. 318 In fact, in Granjinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg, 319 the Court extended this view, and held that a person sued 
for fraudulent conveyance had a right to a jury, despite Congress' des-
ignation of these actions as "core proceedings" adjudicated in Article I 
Courts. 320 Additionally, in Curtis v. Loether, 321 the Court held that a 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applied to an action pursuant 
to "section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,322 [which] authorizes 
private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations of Title 
VIII, the fair housing provisions of the Act."323 
This trend is consistent with the recent Supreme Court cases of 
Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 324 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 
Inc., 325 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Inc. 326 In 
each instance, the Court analyzed various historical analogues, but fo-
cused more emphasis on the characterization of the remedy.327 For 
example, in Curtis, the Court drew the analogue that "[a] damages 
action under the statute sounds basically in tort - the statute merely 
defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a 
statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for dam-
ages in the ordinary courts of law"). ld. at 194. 
316. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509. 
317. See supra Part II.A. 
318. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989). When Con-
gress creates law granting new "public rights," if a violation would be adju-
dicated by an administrative agency, a denial of jury rights will not be 
deemed a violation of the Seventh Amendment. Id. However, "private 
right" cases are still afforded Seventh Amendment protection. ld. 
319. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
320. /d. at 36. 
321. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
322. /d. at 189. 
323. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 189. The Court further identified other examples of the 
application of the Seventh Amendment to statutory causes of action. /d. at 
193; see also Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (trademark laws); 
Fleitman v. Welshach St. Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (antitrust laws); Hepnerv. 
United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (immigration laws). 
324. 494 u.s. 558 (1990). 
325. 523 U.S. 340 (1998). 
326. 526 U.S. 687 (1999); see also supra Part II.A. 
327. See supra Part II.A.l-3. The Court did this expressly in Terry when it found 
itself in "equipose" after characterization of the issues presented and de-
cided the jury question based upon the characterization of the remedy. See 
supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach."328 
This rather broad characterization would be satisfied by numerous 
statutory claims. In fact, this is the same characterization the Court 
made in Del Monte Dunes when analyzing§ 1983 claims.329 The Court 
explained that such claims, independent of their specific characteris-
tics, are sound in tort and are legal. 330 
Mter characterizing the historical analogue, the issue of the right to 
jury is often resolved by classification of the remedy requested. When 
the remedy requested is monetary, the Court classifies the award as 
"legal," although noting that they "do not go so far as to say that any 
award of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief."331 How-
ever, the only example to which the Court has referred, without decid-
ing expressly, is the possible characterization of the remedy available 
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an action for back pay 
and reinstatement as "equitable."332 
2. Procedural Technicalities and Advancements 
The second line of cases demonstrate that mere procedural techni-
calities, unique to the common law system and irrelevant after the 
merger of law and equity, as well as the procedural advancements 
made pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will allow a 
finding of a right to a jury trial. 333 For example, in Beacon Theatres v. 
Westover, 334 the Court held that when legal and equitable claims are 
joined in one suit, the legal claims must be resolved first by a jury, so 
as to protect the party's right to jury trial over the legal issues.335 The 
rationale of the Court rested on a finding that "the justification for 
equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction, and refusing 
to dismiss a case, merely because a subsequent legal remedy becomes 
available, must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder 
[rules] ."336 
Justice Stewart, in dissent, chastised the majority for expanding the 
right to jury in a "marked departure from long-settled principles."337 
Justice Stewart argued that the majority: 
[S]weeps away these basic principles as 'precedents decided 
under discarded procedures' .... [and] suggests that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have somehow worked an 
'expansion of adequate legal remedies' so as to oust the Dis-
328. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195. 
329. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
330. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 709. 
331. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196; see also Teamsters v. terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
332. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97. 
333. See infra notes 334-54 and accompanying text. 
334. 359 u.s. 500 (1959). 
335. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508-09. 
336. /d. at 509. 
337. /d. at 517 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
2002] The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial 
trict Courts of equitable jurisdiction, as well as deprive them 
of their traditional power to control their own dockets. 338 
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Three years later, the Court, continuing in the Beacon Theatres tradi-
tion, decided Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.339 This case involved breach of 
contract and trademark infringement claims in which the plaintiff re-
quested injunctive relief and an accounting to determine the amount 
owed and judgment for that amount.340 The defendant in Dairy Queen 
argued that the entire action was purely equitable according to the 
equitable relief sought - injunction and an accounting - or, in the 
alternative, "if not purely equitable, whatever legal issues that were 
raised were 'incidental' to equitable issues, and, in either case, no 
right to trial by jury existed."341 The Court disagreed and held that an 
"incidental" rule may not be applied in the federal courts after Beacon 
Theatres because the right to trial by jury over all legal issues may be 
preserved under the liberal procedural rules. 342 The Court further 
explained that: 
The constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to 
depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings. 
The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for 
an equitable accounting . . . is the absence of an adequate 
remedy at law . . . . In view of the powers given to [courts 
under the Federal Rules] to appoint special masters to assist 
the jury in those exceptional cases where legal issues are too 
complicated for the jury adequately to handle alone, the bur-
den of such a showing is considerably increased [if not 
impossible] .343 
Thus, the Court found another example of "procedural changes 
which remove the inadequacy of a remedy at law ... sharp [ly] dimin-
ish [ing] the scope of traditional equitable remedies by making them 
unnecessary in many cases."344 
Ross v. Bernhara345 is a final example of the trend of procedural 
changes resulting in an "expansion" of legal remedies and an "expan-
sion" of the basic right to trial by jury. 346 The Court in Ross held that a 
shareholder has a right to a jury on all legal issues presented in the 
shareholder's derivative suit, regardless of whether such an action at 
common law was purely equitable, because the shareholder was with-
338. /d. at 518 (quoting the majority opinion). 
339. 369 u.s. 469 (1962). 
340. /d. at 475. 
341. /d. at 470. 
342. /d. at 479 n.19 (quoting Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509). 
343. /d. at 477-78. 
344. /d. at 478 n.19. 
345. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
346. /d. at 540. 
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out standing to sue in a court of law. 347 The Court reasoned that the 
derivative action "has dual aspects: first, the stockholder's right to sue 
on behalf of the corporation, historically an equitable matter; second, 
the claim of the corporation against directors or third parties on 
which, if the corporation had sued and the claim presented legal is-
sues, the company could demand a jury trial."348 
The shareholder's derivative suit is similar to the class action, in that 
prior to the merger of law and equity they were equitable devices. 349 
Due to the merger of law and equity, a class action plaintiff now has a 
right to a jury on all legal issues presented, as do shareholders, be-
cause "[a]fter adoption of the rules there is no longer any procedural 
obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries [in these in-
] 
,350 stances .... 
Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that: 
Somehow the Amendment and the Rules magically interact 
to do what each separately was expressly intended not to do, 
namely, to enlarge the right to a jury trial in civil actions 
brought in the courts of the United States .... Today the 
Court tosses aside history, logic, and over 100 years of firm 
precedent .... 351 
Justice Stewart explained that a shareholder's suit at common law 
was not viewed as a suit to enforce a corporate cause of action, but 
rather "was conceived of as an equitable action to enforce the right of 
a beneficiary against his trustee."352 Unlike prior cases involving mul-
tiple claims: 
[A] derivative suit has always been conceived of as a single, 
unitary, equitable cause of action .... [T]here are for the 
most part, no such things as inherently 'legal issues' or inher-
ently 'equitable issues.' There are only factual issues, and 
'like chameleons [they] take their color from surrounding 
circumstances . ' ... If history is to be so cavalierly dismissed, 
the derivative suit can, of course, be artificially broken down 
into separable elements. But so then can any traditionally 
equitable cause of action, and the logic of the Court's posi-
tion would lead to the virtual elimination of all equity 
jurisdiction. 353 
Some twenty years later, the Supreme Court came close to proving 
Justice Stewart correct in Terry, a case in which the Court used the 
347. !d. at 532. 
348. !d. at 538. 
349. !d. at 542. 
350. !d. at 541-42. 
351. !d. at 543-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
352. !d. at 545. 
353. /d. at 549-50 (quoting j. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.11 [5) (2d ed. 
1969)). 
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"dual nature" of an action against a Union to support finding a right 
to jury trial on all legal issues presented in that case.354 
B. The Supreme Court Taketh Away- Whittling Away at the Right to jury 
Over fifty years ago, 'Justice Black lamented the 'gradual process of 
judicial erosion which in one-hundred-fifty years has slowly worn away 
a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amend-
ment."'355 About a quarter century ago Justice Marshall cried 
"[t]oday, the erosion [of the Seventh Amendment guarantee] reaches 
bedrock."356 Again, some twenty years ago, Justice Rehnquist ex-
claimed that the majority "reduces this valued right [to jury trial], 
which Blackstone praised as 'the glory of the English law,' to a mere 
'neutral' factor ... [and imposes a] wholesale abrogation of jury tri-
als."357 Moreover, only six years ago, Justice Scalia, continuing these 
observations of his predecessors, stated that "this is a bad day for the 
Constitution's distinctive Article III courts in general, and for the role 
of the jury in those courts in particular."358 In each instance, the 
Court had deprived parties of their Constitutional right to a jury, ei-
ther under the guise that the issue involved was a mere procedural 
reform not essential to the right to trial by jury or by deciding that the 
court had a right to review the jury's decision. 
It is interesting to contrast the language of the Court when assessing 
the basic right to a trial by jury versus when addressing incidents of 
the right to jury or reexamination of the jury's decision. In the first 
group of cases, the right to a jury trial is viewed in the highest regard: 
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic 
and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurispru-
dence that is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right 
so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaran-
teed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be 
jealously guarded by the courts.359 
In contrast, in cases addressing incidents of the right to jury or reex-
amination of the jury's decision, the Court plays down the significance 
of the jury, stating that "the presence or absence of a jury as fact 
finder is basically neutral .... [In fact,] many procedural devices de-
veloped since 1971 ... have diminished the civil jury's historic do-
354. See Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); see also supra Part 
II.A.l. 
355. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) 
(Black, J., dissenting)). 
356. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
357. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 338-39, 353 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
358. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 469 (1996) (Scalia,]., 
dissenting). 
359. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942). 
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main."36° Furthermore, the Court asserted, "it is the substance of the 
right to jury trial that is preseiVed, not the incidental or collateral ef-
fects of common-law practice in 1791."361 
Do the mere procedural devices introduced, or the incidents of the 
right to jury found not fundamental to the jury right, severely deni-
grate the right to jury contemplated by the Constitution? Is the char-
acterization of an issue as legal or factual devoid of meaningful 
inquiry today and, thus, no longer a basis for defining the scope of a 
jury right? To determine the answers to these questions, one must 
review the devices or issues that involve the right to jury that have 
been held not to violate the Seventh Amendment. For example, the 
modern directed verdict, 362 retrial limited to the question of dam-
ages,363 summary judgment,364 remittitur,365 nonmutual collateral es-
toppel,366 and appellate review of a trial court's denial to set aside a 
jury's verdict as excessive367 have all been upheld after Seventh 
Amendment challenge. Are these cases consistent with the cases pre-
serving the basic right to jury under the common law? 
1. The Jury as Fact Finder: The Essence of the Right to Jury Trial 
At issue in Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pan/68 was the power of the trial judge to render final judgment after 
a jury verdict when the specific findings of the jury were found by the 
judge to be inconsistent with its general verdict.369 The Court began 
by noting, with no citation to prior precedent, that the Seventh 
Amendment: 
360. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 332 n.19, 336. 
361. !d. at 345 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
362. SeeGallowayv. United States, 319 U.S. 372,388-93 (1943). History and pre-
vious decisions support the notion that the Seventh Amendment was de-
signed to protect the basic institution of the jury trial, not "the mass of 
procedural forms and details." !d. at 392. 
363. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) 
(declining to follow the ancient rule where a verdict erroneous as to one 
issue but correct as to others must be set aside entirely). 
364. See Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (hold-
ing that summary judgment does not deprive the defendant of the right to 
a jury trial because there is no issue of fact if summary judgment is 
granted). 
365. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 292 U.S. 474 (1935) (upholding remittitur without 
granting a new right to a jury trial). 
366. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979) (holding 
that the use of defensive collateral estoppel does not violate the right to a 
jury trial). 
367. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 (holding that the Seventh Amendment is not 
violated by appellate review of the trial court's denial of a motion to set 
aside a verdict as excessive). 
368. 165 u.s. 593 (1897). 
369. !d. at 596. 
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[D]oes not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or prac-
tice, or to determine in what way issues shall be framed by 
which questions of fact are to be submitted to a jury. Its aim 
is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but 
substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in com-
mon law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall 
not assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to 
itself such prerogative. So long as this substance of right is 
preserved, the procedure by which this result shall be 
reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature 
370 
263 
The argument attacking the constitutionality of such a power was 
based on the common law rule that the judge, while authorized to 
grant a new trial, could not overturn the general verdict in favor of a 
judgment consistent with the special interrogatories.371 The Court 
disagreed, reasoning that the answers to the special interrogatories 
comprised the factfinding of the jury.372 Thus, the Court found that 
issuing a judgment consistent with those findings did not tread upon 
the party's right to a jury trial because the party had only a right to 
have the jury decide the facts. 373 A general verdict under these cir-
cumstances was an application of the law to the facts and within the 
authority of the judge to decide.374 
In 1920, the Supreme Court held that use of an "auditor" to initiate 
a factual investigation, examine the parties and witnesses, and file a 
report to the court for the limited purpose of "simplifying the issues 
for the jury," without making any final determination of the issues, did 
not violate the Seventh Amendment. 375 The Court relied upon the 
same rationale as in Walker- that the Constitution "does not require 
that old forms of practice and procedure be retained ... [but rather 
allows] the introduction of new methods for determining what facts 
are actually in issue [in order to make the court] ... an efficient 
instrument in the administration ofjustice."376 The right to jury is not 
obstructed so long as the jury may make its final determination of the 
facts without interference.377 Thus, despite an opinion formed by the 
auditor on the facts and items in dispute that may "be treated, at most, 
as prima facie evidence . . . . The parties will remain free to call, ex-
370. Id. (emphasis added). 
371. Id. at 597-98. 
372. Id. at 597. 
373. Id. at 598. 
374. Walker, 165 U.S. at 596-98. 
375. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 304 (1920) (quoting Peterson v. Davison, 254 
F. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)). The use of an auditor is similar to the use of a 
special master. 
376. Id. at 309-10 (citing Walker, 165 U.S. at 596). 
377. Id. at 310. 
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amine, and cross-examine witnesses ... [and thus] [n]o incident of 
the jury trial is modified or taken away .... "378 
2. Mere Procedural Incidents 
The Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. 379 case is one of the few 
cases in which a "procedural" incident to the right to jury was found 
unconstitutional by the Court. 380 The issue was whether a court could 
overrule a jury verdict and enter judgment in the defendant's favor. 381 
Justice Van Devanter reasoned that at common law, the court could 
have ordered a new trial on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to 
present sufficient evidence, but could not enter judgment in defen-
dant's favor. 382 Because a new trial was viewed as qualitatively differ-
ent from the entry of a judgment for the defendant, the Court found 
that judgment notwithstanding the verdict was unconstitutional. 383 
Twenty years later, in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,384 a 
case almost identical to Slocum, the Court "virtually" overruled Slo-
cum. 385 The Redman court held that the Seventh Amendment is not 
violated if the trial court reverses a jury verdict and enters judgment in 
defendant's favor, as long as it reserves its ruling on the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict based on the asserted insufficiency of 
the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff. 386 Because the suf-
ficiency of the evidence is deemed a matter of law for the court, the 
verdict for plaintiff by the jury "was taken pending the court's rulings 
on the motions and subject to those rulings."387 This distinction was 
considered significant by Justice Van Devanter (the same Justice who 
authored Slocum) because reserving questions of law arising during a 
trial by jury and taking verdicts subject to those rulings were well-es-
tablished at common law. 388 The rationale for such authority was that 
it provided a better opportunity for considered rulings and made new 
trials less frequent. 389 
The constitutionality of the modern directed verdict came under 
attack in Galloway v. United States.390 It was argued that at common 
law, courts could withhold cases from the jury or set aside the verdict 
for insufficiency of the evidence by two motions: the demurrer to the 
378. /d. at 311 (emphasis in original). 
379. 228 U.S. 364 (1913). 
380. /d. at 385. 
381. /d. at 376. 
382. !d. at 380. 
383. /d. at 399. The plaintiff, at least, gets a second chance at a jury verdict. 
384. 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
385. /d. at 658-59. 
386. /d. 
387. /d. at 659. 
388. /d. The authority to grant a new trial and direct a verdict for the "losing" 
party were also well-established at common law. /d. 
389. Redman, 295 U.S. at 660. 
390. 319 u.s. 372, 390 (1943). 
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evidence or motion for new trial.391 The directed verdict today, how-
ever, differs from these two motions because the directed verdict in-
volves a "higher standard[] of proof . . . and . . . different 
consequences follow" the court's ruling.392 The majority, consistent 
with the rationale that the Seventh Amendment does "not bind the 
federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial 
according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to 
the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence 
then prevailing,"393 held that the modern-day directed verdict does 
not offend the right to trial by jury.394 The majority relied on the rec-
ognition that the rules of the common law were not "crystallized in a 
fixed and immutable system . . . [but] were constantly changing and 
developing during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. "395 
The Court then cited to cases and commentary from England and 
the United States, illuminating the constant development of the non-
suit and demurrer to the evidence between 1779 and 1828.396 It is 
unclear why this is even relevant, as the relevant inquiry is English law 
in 1791. Moreover, the Court explained that "the passage of time has 
obscured much of the procedure which then may have had more or 
less definite form, even for historical purposes."397 From these pro-
positions the Court determined that the "logical conclusion ... is that 
the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury 
trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of pro-
cedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among com-
mon-law jurisdictions. "398 
Next, the majority turned from the historical approach, because it 
had determined that there was no Constitutional requirement that 
the specifics be "preserved," and instead looked to functional consid-
erations to decide the question presented. 399 This technique is simi-
lar to that recently used in Markman and Del Monte Dunes.400 Under 
the common law approach, the moving party was required to concede 
the full scope of the opponent's evidence and to admit that they have 
no case if the opponent's case is found legally sufficient. In other 
words, if the demurrer was granted, the judge entered judgment for 




394. Id. at 392. 
395. Id. at 391. 
396. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391 n.23. 
397. Id. at 392 (citing Henry Schofield, New Trials and the Seventh Amendment, 8 
ILL. L. REv. 287, 381, 465 (1913)). 
398. Id. 
399. See id. at 394-95. 
400. See supra notes 166-70, 226-35 and accompanying text. 
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the nonmoving party.401 Today, of course, if the directed verdict is 
denied or reserved, the case is presented to the jury. The majority in 
Galloway reasoned that the directed verdict provides for more deci-
sions by the jury when the motions are denied and, therefore, upheld 
the directed verdict.402 However, as the dissent pointed out, few par-
ties brought demurrers because of their draconian nature, and as a 
result, there were more cases decided by juries under the common law 
approach. 403 
Additionally, the majority allowed a less strict standard of review, 
stating that standards: 
[C]annot be framed wholesale for the great variety of situa-
tions in respect to which the question arises .... It hardly 
affords help to insist upon "substantial evidence" rather than 
"some evidence" or "any evidence" .... The matter is essen-
tially one to be worked out in particular situations .... [T] he 
essential requirement is that mere speculation be not al-
lowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due allow-
ance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party 
whose case is attacked.404 
The dissent took exception to this explanation because the "sub-
stantial evidence" standard "permit[s] directed verdicts even though 
there [is] far more evidence in the case than a plaintiff would have 
needed to withstand a demurrer."405 Initially, federal courts allowed 
the case to go to a jury unless there was "no evidence" to support the 
nonmoving party's case.406 Soon it was declared that "some evidence" 
was not enough, and that "there must be evidence sufficiently persua-
sive to the judge so that he thinks 'a jury can properly proceed.' "407 
Clearly, although these are mere terms to be applied, they set differ-
ent standards, and the current rule allows for the granting of more 
directed verdicts, resulting in less jury decisions. As the dissent ex-
plained: "Either the judge or the jury must decide facts, and to the 
extent that [the judge] take[s] this responsibility, we lessen the jury 
function. "408 
Another "procedural" issue addressed by the Supreme Court arose 
in Gasoline Products, Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. 409 In Gasoline Products, 
the Court held that setting aside a verdict in part and ordering a re-
401. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 394 n.29. 
402. Jd. 
403. !d. at 402-03 (Black, J., dissenting). 
404. Jd. at 395. 
405. Jd. at 403. 
406. Jd. at 403-04. 
407. Jd. at 404 (citing Schuylkill & Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 
u.s. 442, 448 (1871)). 
408. Jd. at 407. 
409. 283 U.S. 494 (1931). 
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trial of damages alone did not violate the Seventh Amendment.410 It 
was undisputed that such a procedure was unavailable at common 
law.411 At common law, if a verdict was deemed erroneous with re-
spect to any issue, an entire new trial was held.412 The Court, never-
theless, found this to be merely a form of procedure that need not be 
retained as it was under the common law.413 
Dimick v. Schied(n 4 was the second rare instance in which the Court 
disallowed a "procedural" incident, additur, as volatile of the Seventh 
Amendment.415 The Court distinguished the accepted practice of re-
mittitur by explaining that: 
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a 
remission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible 
support in the view that what remains is included in the ver-
dict .... But where the verdict is too small, an increase by 
the court is a bald addition of something which in no sense 
can be said to be included in the verdict. 416 
The Court found it necessary to distinguish the two procedures in 
order to avoid extending doubtful precedent upholding remittitur to 
the practice of additur.417 Perhaps the Court would have fared better 
if it recognized the error in its precedent allowing remittitur and 
found both practices in violation of the Seventh Amendment. 
Justice Stone, in his dissent, focused on the popular refrain that the 
Seventh Amendment has always been construed to "preserve the es-
sentials of the jury trial" in actions at law, but has never been con-
strued "to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of trial practice 
as it existed in the English courts in 1791."418 In analyzing the histori-
cal guides, Justice Stone reasoned that: 
[T] he common law was something more than a miscellane-
ous collection of precedents. It was a system, then a growth 
of some five centuries, to guide judicial decision. One of its 
principles, certainly as important as any other, and that 
which assured the possibility of the continuing vitality and 
usefulness of the system, was its capacity for growth and de-
velopment, and its adaptability to every new situation .... 
. . . If this Court could thus, in conformity to common law, 
substitute a new rule for an old one because it was more con-
410. /d. at 499. 
411. See id. at 498. 
412. /d. at 497. 
413. /d. at 498 ("It is the Constitution which we are to interpret; and the Consti-
tution is concerned, not with form, but with substance."). 
414. 293 u.s. 474 (1935). 
415. /d. at 486. 
416. /d. at 486. 
417. /d. at 485. 
418. /d. at 490 (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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sonant with modern conditions, it would seem that no vio-
lence would be done to the common law by extending the 
principle of the remittitur to the case where the verdict is 
inadequate, although the common law had made no rule on 
the subject in 1791.419 
The majority responded that although the common law is flexible: 
[H] ere, we are dealing with a constitutional provision which 
has in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect 
of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791. To effectuate 
any change in these rules is not to deal with the common 
law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution.420 
Recently, the Court in Hetzel v. Prince William Countt21 circum-
scribed the ability of courts to allow remittitur.422 The Hetzel Court 
held that the Seventh Amendment requires that a judge allow the 
plaintiff the option of a new trial when imposing a remittitur.423 
3. The Definition of 'Jury" 
Aside from these "procedural" incidents, the actual definition of 
the 'jury" has been challenged. Specifically, in Colgrove v. Battin,424 
the Court determined that reducing the size of the civil jury from 
twelve to six persons did not violate the Seventh Amendment.425 The 
dissent warned that the reduction in jury size is not "some minor tink-
ering with the role of the civil jury, but [involves] its wholesale aboli-
tion and replacement with a different institution which functions 
differently, produces different results, and was wholly unknown to the 
Framers of the Seventh Amendment."426 Nevertheless, the majority 
argued that on its face, the language of the Seventh Amendment "is 
not directed to jury characteristics, such as size, but rather defines the 
kind of cases for which jury trial is preserved, namely 'suits at common 
law.' "427 Because the state practices varied so widely as to the cases in 
which civil jury trial was provided, the proponents were left resorting 
to the general words "suits at common law."428 This reasoning, how-
ever, does not explain what the Framers had in mind by the term 
'jury." As the dissent argued: "To the extent that anything at all can 
be inferred from the rejection of these arguments [that state practices 
differed], it follows ... that the Framers intended to override state 
419. /d. at 495-96. 
420. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 487. 
421. 523 U.S. 208 (1998). 
422. /d. at 211. 
423. /d. 
424. 413 u.s. 149 (1973). 
425. /d. at 160. 
426. /d. at 166-67 (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
427. /d. at 152 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. Amend. VII). 
428. /d. at 153-55. 
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differences as to both the cases in which a jury right would attach and 
the characteristics of the jury itself."429 
Further, as there was little debate over the use of the term 'jury," 
one could argue that even when a dispute arose regarding whether a 
right to jury trial attached, all parties would agree to the nature of the 
jury.430 
To further support its decision, the majority in Colgrove analyzed 
whether the size of a jury was necessary to maintain the essence of the 
right to a jury trial. 431 The Court cited numerous studies conducted 
to determine the impact of six versus twelve member juries and con-
cluded that, because there was no significant difference between ver-
dicts of the different-sized juries, a jury of six satisfied the Seventh 
Amendment.432 The majority reasoned that the only jury require-
ment is to have enough people, who represent a cross-section of the 
community, to engage in deliberation.433 The dissent found an inher-
ent problem with this analysis: 
[T] he composition of the jury itself is a matter of arbitrary, a 
priori definition. As Mr. Justice Harlan argued, "[t]he right 
to a trial by jury . . . has no enduring meaning apart from 
historical form." It is senseless then to say that a panel of six 
constitutes a 'jury" without first defining what one means by 
a jury, and that initial definition must, in the nature of 
things, be arbitrary .... 
Since some definition of 'jury" must be chosen, [we should] 
rely on the fixed bounds of history which the Framers, by 
drafting the Seventh Amendment, meant to "preserve."434 
As far back as 1899, Justice Gray in Capital Traction Co. v. Ho_r35 
analyzed the history of the . Seventh Amendment extensively and 
explained: 
"Trial by jury," in the primary and usual sense of the term at 
the common law and in the American constitutions, is ... a 
trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the 
429. I d. at 175 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority only noted the variety of 
state practices, concerning when the right to jury applied, suggesting that 
the state practices were uniform regarding what comprised the jury (twelve 
persons). However, the dissent pointed out that other state practices re-
garding " [ t] he manner of summoning jurors, their qualifications, of whom 
they should consist, and the course of their proceedings" vary widely. Col-
grove, 413 U.S. at 174 (quoting 3M. FARRAND, REcoRDS OF FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION 101, 164 (1911)). 
430. Id. at 173. 
431. Id. at 157. 
432. Id. at 159-60 and n.15. 
433. Id. at 160 n.16. 
434. Id. at 180, 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). This raises an interesting contrast between "essentialist" versus 
"constructivist" approaches to defining what a jury is. 
435. 174 U.S. 1 (1899). 
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superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on 
the law and to advise them on the facts . . . . This proposi-
tion has been so generally admitted, and so seldom con-
tested, that there has been little occasion for its distinct 
assertion .. 
The terms 'jury' and 'trial by jury' are, and for ages have 
been, well known in the language of the law .... A jury for 
the trial of a cause was a body of twelve men, described as 
upright, well-qualified and lawful men, disinterested and im-
partial, not of kin nor personal dependents of either of the 
parties, having their homes within the jurisdictional limits of 
the court, drawn and selected by officers free from all bias in 
favor or against either party, duly empanelled under the di-
rection of a competent court, sworn to render a true verdict 
according to the law and the evidence given them; who, after 
hearing ... the instructions of the court relative to the law 
involved in the trial, and deliberating, when necessary, apart 
from all extraneous influences, must return their unanimous 
verdict upon the issue submitted to them.436 
The majority approach in Colgrove is thus unusable. How does one 
determine how many persons are enough? As Justice Marshall noted 
in dissent, "[m] erely observing that a certain level of group represen-
tation is constitutionally required fails to tell us what that level is. 
And, more significantly, it fails to tell us how to go about deciding 
what that level is. "437 
4. Reexamination of the Jury's Decision 
Finally, the Supreme Court's treatment of the Reexamination 
Clause of the Seventh Amendment further denigrates the right to 
jury. As discussed above, the Court in Gasperini held for the first time 
that an appellate court could review the trial court's denial to set aside 
a jury's verdict as excessive,438 over the vigorous dissent of Justice 
Scalia.439 Also, the Court found that a trial judge could review the 
findings of the jury under the standard provided by state statutes.440 
Thus, pursuant to Gasperini, a trial judge in a New York court will re-







!d. at 13-15 (citations omitted) (quoting Opinion of Justices, 41 N.H. 550, 
551 (1860)). In fact, as recently as 1987,Justice Scalia referred to the jury 
as "12 private citizens." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 428 (1987). 
Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 180 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996). 
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Id. at 437-38. 
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425. 
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Additionally, the Court in Cooper Industries held that the standard of 
appellatereview ofajury award of punitive damages is de novo review, 
not abuse of discretion.442 The Court stated that the 'jury's award of 
punitive damages does not constitute a finding of 'fact' ... [and thus] 
does not implicate the Seventh Amendment .... "443 
These two recent decisions are further examples of the Court's di-
minishing the significance of the parties' right to jury trial. In sum, 
there are numerous instances when the Court denigrated the right to 
jury by allowing judicial intervention that was not found at common 
law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court clearly wants to have its cake and eat it too. On 
the one hand, the Court eloquently speaks of the fundamental right 
to trial by jury and carefully preserves that right by adherence to his-
torical analogies with almost a predisposition to find that a right ex-
isted at common law.444 In the next breath, however, the Court finds 
that a jury need not determine particular issues as these issues are 
merely incidents to the right to jury.445 Further, the Court allows deci-
sions to be reviewed by both the trial and appellate judges and the 
results overturned, damages reduced, or a new trial granted, reducing 
the integrity of the right to jury trial. 446 Moreover, there is no essence 
to what constitutes a 'jury" even though certain basic attributes of the 
jury were fairly well-established in the minds of the Framers.447 The 
result, as Justice Marshall said some twenty-eight years ago is "that the 
common-law jury is destined to expire, not with a bang, but a whim-
per."448 Perhaps, we are beginning to hear the final sobs today. 
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